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RECENT TRENDS IN THE CRIMINAL LAW
CONsPIfRACY
In United States v. Figuercdo,_F. Supp.__(M.D.
Fla. 1972), the common law doctrine known as
Wharton's (or the "concert of action"' ) Rule was
relied upon by the court to dismiss a conspiracy
count against eight defendants for conspiring to
conduct an illegal gambling business in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 1955.2
Wharton's Rule provides that conspiracy charges
cannot be brought for crimes whose very nature
requires concerted action by the participants.3
In other words, where cooperation or conspiracy
is an inherent element of a substantive offense,
courts have deemed it unfair to also charge the
parties with conspiracy to commit that crime.
4
The crimes of adultery, incest, abortion, and duel-
ing, which necessarily require concerted action
by two parties for their commission, are ones to
which this doctrine has frequently been applied.5
Enacted as part of the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970,6 § 1955, which the defendants were
charged with both violating and conspiring to
violate, prohibits illegal gambling businesses which
involve, among other elements, "five or more
persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise,
direct, or own all or part of such business." 7 Be-
cause of this requirement of five or more par-
ticipants, the Figueredo court found § 1955 in-
herently conspiratorial and therefore within the
logic of Wharton's Rule. As support for its posi-
ISee United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 1092
(N.D. Ohio 1971).
2 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970) makes operation of a gam-
bling business a federal crime if it violates state law, in-
volves five or more persons who conduct the operation,
and has been in existence for over thirty consecutive
days and grosses a revenue in excess of $2,000 per day.
3 R. ANDERSON, 1. WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND
PRocEDuRE § 89 (1957).
4 See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640,
643 (1946); Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 121
(1932); United States v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354, 355-56
(1926); Baker v. United States, 393 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.
1968).5 See, e.g., State v. Law, 189 Iowa 760, 179 N.W. 145
(1920) (adultery); Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa.
226 (1850) (adultery); Commonwealth v. Bricker, 74
Pa. Super. Ct. 234 (1920) (abortion).
6 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1955-68 (1970).
7 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970). According to the Figueredo
court, this element was added to make the statute
federally cognizable.
tion that Congress did not intend § 1955 to be an
offense for which conspiracy could be charged, the
court pointed to the existence of 18 U.S.C. § 1511
which was enacted with § 1955, but which ex-
pressly prohibits conspiracies to obstruct enforce-
ment of gambling laws.8
Application of Wharton's Rule to § 1955 had
been considered in two cases prior to Figueredo.
In United States v. Greenberg9 the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio
applied the Rule to dismiss conspiracy charges
against thirteen defendants. The Greenberg court
held that concerted action was central to a viola-
tion of § 1955, while the number of participants
was inconsequential, especially because five is
expressed as a minimum number necessary to
violate the statute. A contrary conclusion was
reached by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in United States v. Becker,0
which held that the naming of seven defendants,
or two more persons than required for a § 1955
violation, took the case out of the scope of Whar-
ton's Rule.
Disagreeing with the holding of the Beckcr case,
the Figueredo court claimed the Becker opinion
improperly relied upon a line of cases which had
applied one of the recognized limitations to Whar-
ton's Rule-the third person exceptionu-which
8 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970).
9 334 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ohio 1971).10 461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972).
1 There are three other common exceptions to Whar-
ton's Rule. One exception states that the Rule does not
apply when one of the conspirators alone could commit
the offense. Conspiracy charges have been sustained,
for instance, for conspiring to smuggle and defraud cus-
toms. United States v. Shevlin, 212 F. 343 (D. Mass.
1913). Wharton's Rule also does not apply to violations
in which concerted action is not logically necessary,
although as a practical matter cooperation is required
to commit the crime. This exception was employed in
Lisansky v. United States, 31 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1929),
where two partners were prosecuted for conspiring to
defraud the government by filing a false partnership tax
return, because the statute specified that one partner
could fill out the return. Another exception to the rule
is applied to crimes in which the law defining the offense
does not impose any sanctions on one of the essential
participants. A conspiracy charge was allowed, for ex-
ample, where a railroad employee conspired with a third
person to provide him with free tickets, thus violating a
federal law which punished the railroad and the person
using the free tickets, but not the employee. United
States v. Clark, 164 F. 75 (W.D. Mo. 1908). See AN-
DERSON, supra note 3.
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the court argued is not applicable to § 1955. That
exception states that when essential participants
conspire with a third party to commit a crime, all
are guilty of a conspiracy, the rationale being that
an element has been added which was not part of
the substantive offense. In one case involving a
conspiracy by three persons to sell stolen goods,
for example, the third party was simply a go-
between for the thief and the buyer and conse-
quently not a necessary participant in the crime
12
That added element distinguished the conspiracy
from the crime of selling stolen goods. According
to the Figueredo court, however, the manner in
which § 1955 was drafted renders the third person
exception inapplicable because all participants are
necessarily within the terms of the statute. In
addition, the Figueredo court argued that the
Becker reading of the Rule would provide prose-
cutors with an easy means to circumvent the
Rule-simply by charging more than five people
with participation in the crime.
If courts continue to apply Wharton's Rule to
§ 1955, the Government will no longer be able to
resort to conspiracy charges when prosecuting
gambling activities.
GRAND JumrEs
In United States v. Dionisio, 93 S. Ct. 764 (1973),
the United States Supreme Court resolved a con-
flict between two federal circuit courts by holding
that a federal grand jury can subpoena voice
exemplars without making a preliminary showing
of the reasonableness of the request.13 The grand
jury in Dionisio subpoenaed approximately twenty
people to produce voice samples for comparison
with recorded conversations presented in the grand
jury's investigation of possible violations of the
federal gambling laws. Warned that they were
potential defendants, Dionisio and other witnesses
refused to furnish the voiceprints, claiming the
requests violated their rights under the fourth and
fifth amendments.
"2 See United States v. Smolin, 182 F.2d 782, 786 (2d
Cir. 1950).
3 In United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457 F.2d 895
(2d Cir. 1972), the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit affirmed a contempt holding against a grand jury
witness for refusing to furnish handwriting samples.
Previously the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit-
reversed findings of contempt against grand jury wit-
nesses for refusing to furnish voice samples in In re
Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971), and handwriting
samples in United States v. Mara, 454 F.2d 580 (7th
Cir. 1971), to grand juries which did not make pre-
liminary showings of reasonableness.
Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart re-
jected the argument that the defendants' fifth
amendment rights were violated. He ruled that the
compelled production of voiceprints fell within the
holdings of Gilbert v. California"4 and United
States v. Wade15 which specified, respectively, that
compelled handwriting exemplars and utterances in
a line-up of words spoken by a bank robber did not
violate the fifth amendment privilege because they
were not evidence of a testimonial or communica-
tive nature.
According to Justice Stewart, two inquiries were
needed to determine whether the fourth amend-
ment was violated by this compulsory production
of voiceprints--whether the compelled appearance
before the grand jury or the request for the voice
exemplar constituted an unreasonable seizure
prohibited by the fourth amendment. The sub-
poena to appear before the grand jury was held
not to be a seizure because of the historically
recognized obligation of citizens to make such
appearances and the fact that no social stigma is
attached to a grand jury appearance.18 With
regard to the directive to make voice recordings,
the Court held that the constant exposure of one's
voice to the public eliminates any feelings of
privacy which a person might have in the sound
of his voice and makes its disclosure a much less
serious infringment of an individual's privacy
than an intrusion into one's body, such as the
extraction of a blood sample which was held not to
violate the fourth amendment in Schinerber v.
California.P7 The Court also stated that a seizure
of voice exemplars is not as great an intrusion as a
stop and frisk." Because an appearance before the
grand jury and the required voiceprint did not
infringe upon any fourth amendment interest, the
Court concluded that there was no justification for
any reasonableness showing as the Seventh Circuit
had required. 9
In Dionisio's companion case, United States v.
Mara, 93 S. Ct. 774 (1973), the Court applied the
same rationale in recognizing the validity of a
grand jury subpoena for handwriting and printing
14 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
15 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
'6 Judge Friendly made a similar point concerning the
absence of social stigma surrounding a grand jury ap-
pearance in United States v. Doe (Schwartz), 457 F.2d
895, 898 (2d Cir. 1972). The validity of this contention
is questioned by the dissenting opinions of Justices
Marshall and Douglas to Dionisio and Mara.
17 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
"1 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
19 In re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971).
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exemplars. The grand jury in Mara was investi-
gating thefts of interstate shipments. Its subpoena
of Mara's handwriting samples was approved by
the district court after an in camera inspection of
the FBI affidavit. Subsequent contempt charges
against Mara for refusing to produce the samples
were overturned by the Seventh Circuit which
held that the reasonableness of the subpoena had
to be proved in an open court hearing 20 As with
the voiceprints in Dionisio, the Supreme Court
found no expectation of privacy in the physical
characteristics of one's handwriting. In addition,
the Court commented that the subpoena of a
single person in Mara seemed less suspect than
the dragnet summons of twenty witnesses which
the court of appeals found significant in Dionisio.
Consequently the Court held that the fourth
amendment does not require a showing of rea-
sonableness when a grand jury requests handwrit-
ing exemplars solely for their physical charac-
teristics.
Justice Brennan concurred in the Court's finding
that the subpoenas did not violate the fifth amend-
ment, but dissented in part because he believed
that the fourth amendment requires a showing of
reasonableness before compelling the production
of voice and handwriting exemplars.
Justice Douglas dissented, arguing that the
majority opinion failed to maintain the grand
jury's historical function of protecting citizens
from overzealous prosecutors. Instead he felt that
the decision provided a means by which the gov-
ernment could usurp the powers of the grand jury
whenever it could not establish probable cause for
an arrest. Although not reaching the fifth amend-
ment question, Justice Douglas noted his position
that the protection of the fifth amendment is not
restricted to testimonial compulsion.
In his dissent Justice Marshall stated that the
fifth amendment should not be limited to testi-
monial evidence, but should protect a person
against being required to affirmatively cooperate
in furnishing evidence against himself. He shared
Justice Douglas' concern over official usurpation
of grand jury power, stating that the majority
opinion will allow police to acquire evidence
through the grand jury which could not otherwise
be acquired. Justice Marshall also questioned the
majority's statement that no stigma surrounds
grand jury subpoenas and appearances, arguing
10 United States v. Mara, 454 F.2d 580 (7th Cir.
1971).
that practical experience indicated otherwise. He
also disagreed with the majority view that a "stop
and frisk" was less an infringement of one's privacy
than a grand jury appearance, pointing out the
gravity with which society regards appearances
before a grand jury. Agreeing with the Seventh
Circuit, Justice Marshall felt that the fourth
amendment would require a showing of reasonable-
ness at an adversary hearing before allowing grand
jury subpoenas of voice and handwriting exem-
plars.
As suggested by the dissenting opinions, Dio-
nisionl and Mara ignore the realities of present
day grand juries. Unless a showing of reasonable-
ness is required for grand jury subpoenas of voice
and handwriting exemplars, grand juries will
become not only a means of getting publicity for
prosecutors but also will become a tool for prose-
cutors to secure evidence which the Constitution
would otherwise prevent them from obtaining.
PRISON DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
While the entire area of prisoners' rights is being
subjected to extensive litigation,2" many challenges
are being directed with varying degrees of success
at prison disciplinary procedures for their viola-
tions of the right against self-incrimination and
the due process guarantees.
In Carter v. McGinnis, - F. Supp. - (W.D.N.Y.
1972), the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York held that punish-
ment of inmates who chose to remain silent at
prison disciplinary hearings because a grand jury
was considering whether to bring criminal charges
against them was an unconstitutional infringement
upon the prisoners' privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The court recognized that the inmates were
faced with the dilemma that any statements made
by them in their defense at the hearing might
later be used against them in criminal proceedings,
either directly or for impeachment purposes."
The plaintiff inmates in Carter urged the court
21 h point is persuasively made in judge Camp-
hell's article, Campbell, Eliminate 11w Grand Jury, 64
J. Cam. L. &.C. 174, passim (1973).
2 See generally Symposium: Prisoner's Rights, 63
3. Can. L.C. & P.S. 154 (1972).
2Because the disciplinary hearings constituted cus-
todial interrogation, the Carter court states the plain-
tiffs should have been given the Miranda warnings.
Although the failure to issue these warnings subjected
any statements so obtained to the exclusionary rule, the
court held that such a remedy provided insufficient pro-
tection for the right against self-incrimination.
[Vol. 64
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to follow Clutchette v. Procuner,24 which held that
any prisoner undergoing disciplinary proceedings
for actions which might later be the basis for
criminal charges was entitled to counsel and to
cross-examine and call witnesses. The defendants,
however, argued that "use" immunity be applied,
so that statements made in a disciplinary hearing
could not be used affirmatively in subsequent
criminal proceedings. Because the prisoners had
already been punished for refusing to testify, the
court was not forced to choose which contention
should be followed in future situations, but it did
hold that the punishment was an unconstitutional
violation of the prisoners' fifth amendment privi-
lege against self-incrimination.
Virtually all aspects of prison disciplinary
hearings were examined in Sands v. Wainwright,
F. Supp. - (M.D. Fla. 1973), with the result
that the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida imposed far-reaching
changes on such proceedings in Florida prisonsP
The court reasoned that solitary confinement and
loss of "gain time" 2 6 constituted sufficient depriva-
tions to require the protections of due process.
First, it ruled that hearing committee members
should be impartial fact finders, and listed in-
stances in which they should be disqualified.F The
court even raised the possibility of having persons
from outside of the prison community serve on the
disciplinary committees, but indicated that good
faith efforts by prison authorities to follow its
mandate would negate the need for such outside
participation.
The court also held that written notice has to be
timely delivered to the accused inmate, detailing
the charges and their factual basis. The inmate
then has the right to explain his conduct and call
witnesses on his behalf. Although the court recog-
nized that an accused might seek revenge upon
2 Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D.
Cal. 1971).25 In Inmates v. Mullaney, - F. Supp. - (D. Me.
1973), the United States District Court for the District
of Maine imposed new rules for Maine prisoners of a
similarly broad scope, but gave prison authorities much
more flexibility in implementing them.
21 "Gain time" reduces a prisoner's sentence because
of good behavior.
VInstances in which the court felt a hearing com-
mittee member should disqualify himself included when
(1) he has participated as an investigating officer in the
matter, (2) he is a witness in the proceedings, (3) his
responsibilities include reviewing the committee deci-
sions, (4) he has knowledge of a material fact, (5) he has
a material involvement, or (6) he has a personal interest
in the outcome. Carter v. McGinnis, - F. Supp.-.
(W.D.N.Y. 1972).
those prisoners who testify against him, it never-
theless viewed the punishments arising from
disciplinary hearings severe enough to afford an
inmate the rights of confrontation and cross-
examination.
Although no need was seen for the prison to
furnish counsel, the court ruled that the accused
should be allowed to retain counsel or be assisted
by voluntary counsel. Stressing that disciplinary
decisions should be made solely upon the facts
presented at the hearings, the court indicated that
some abbreviated record of the proceedings should
be made. While not holding that an avenue of
appealing disciplinary hearings was necessary, any
review of those proceedings was to be limited to
this record. The court, however, rejected the
contention that a public hearing is necessary to
satisfy the due process requirement.
Finally, examining the self-incrimination di-
lemma discussed in Carter, the court disagreed
with the Clutekette holding that counsel is in-
dispensable in such situations. Instead the court
ruled that "use" immunity in any subsequent
prosecution would adequately protect a prisoner's
fifth amendment rights.
Although the Carter and Sands opinions do not
represent the attitudes of all courts, 2 their willing-
ness to provide prison inmates with certain con-
stitutional protections during disciplinary hearings
are likely to carry over into other prison adminis-
trative actions.
ExPNCTON oP REcoRDs
In several recent decisions police retention of
arrest and other records of defendants who have
been acquitted, or suspects who are never prose-
cuted, has been challenged as an infringement of an
individual's right to privacy. In Davidon v. Dill,
503 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1972), the Colorado supreme
court reversed a trial court's dismissal of a com-
plaint which alleged that the retention of arrest
records and fingerprints by the police department
after the plaintiff had been acquitted of loitering
charges was a violation of her right to privacy.29
2In Sellers v. State, - S.C. , - S.E.2d - (1972),
the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that prison
disciplinary actions were not subject to judicial review.
The court justified the denial of rights of notice and
time to prepare an adequate defense on the grounds
that the urgency of the situation required prompt ac-
tion. Rights of confrontation were denied on the
grounds that the guilty inmates could only be appre-
hended promptly if informers were assured their identity
would not be revealed.
29 United States v. Kutchman, No. 72-1582 (7th Cir.
1973]
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Although having only recently recognized a tort
action for violations of the right to privacy30 the
Colorado court ruled that the invasion of such an
important constitutional right warrants additional
judicial control, even in the absence of legislative
action on the subject. The court stated that the
proper test for determining whether an arrest
record should be expunged involves weighing the
individual's interest in privacy and in preventing
adverse consequences from the use of such records
against the public interest in their retention by the
police. The future use of the records, the facts con-
tained in them, and the extent to which they could
be expected to remain confidential were factors to
be considered by the trial court in making that
determination. In addition, even if the trial court
found complete expunction unwarranted, the court
expressed a willingness to shape alternative forms
of relief to protect the plaintiff's right of privacy.
In State v'. Pinkney, 12 BNA CGrm. L. REP. 2351
(C.P. Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio, Jan. 8, 1973), again
an individual's fundamental right of privacy was
the basis for an order by the Court of Common
Pleas for Cuyahoga County, Ohio, to destroy all
county police and court records relating to a
murder suspect whose trial had ended in a hung
jury, after which another person had confessed to
the crime. The court recommended that the de-
fendant also request state and federal law enforce-
ment agencies (including the FBI) to destroy
related records in their possession.
Feb. 27, 1973), suggests the procedural vehicle em-
ployed by the plaintiff in seeking expunction may be
important. In that case the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court
order of expunction on the ground that the acquitted
petitioner's post-trial writ of error corarn nobis did not
present an adequate record for such a determination.
30 Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170, 476 P.2d 753
(1970).
One question left unanswered by both cases is
the extent to which expunction depends upon the
reason for a person's acquittal. The acquittal in
the Davidson case, for example, may have been
because the judge or jury felt there was insufficient
evidence to prove the accused's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The guilt of the accused in the
Pinkney case, on the other hand, was completely
removed when someone else confessed to the crime
for which Pinkney was charged. In several other
major cases expunction was ordered because there
was no probable cause for the arrests and because
the arrests were principally for harassment pur-
poses.3 Although no standards have evolved, an
individual's interest in having his records expunged
seems less in cases in which he is released because
he was not afforded the necessary constitutional
procedural protections than in cases in which his
arrest was initially groundless, as in cases of mis-
taken identity or harassment arrests.
Another unanswered question is whether alterna-
tives to complete expunction will suffice in some
cases to protect the right of privacy. In Rodgers v.
Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1972), the de-
fendant was a school teacher who accidentally fired
a pistol which he had taken to school. He was con-
victed for discharging a firearm, but the conviction
was ruled unconstitutional because he had not been
advised of his right to counsel. Although its per
curiam decision was not explicit, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated a
federal district court order requiring expunction
of all references to the arrest and conviction.
Stating that the privilege of expunction is one of
very narrow scope, the Fifth Circuit ruled the
expunction order was overbroad.
31 United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir.
1967); Wheelerv. Goodman, 306 F. Supp. 58 (W.D.N.C.
1969); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa.
1968).
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